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1INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE
Professor Eileen M. Kane teaches patent law and 
intellectual property law in the United States, and her 
legal scholarship has focused on the intersection of 
patent law and the life sciences, with particular attention 
to the  eld of genetics.1 Professor Kane has a Ph.D. in 
molecular biology and is a registered attorney before 
the United States Patent and Trademark Of ce. She has 
no  nancial interest in the above referenced case. This 
brief is submitted because of the continuing importance 
of striking a balance between the patent system and the 
public domain. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
DNA is a unique molecule in the life sciences because 
it is the chemical repository of inheritance, written in the 
language of the genetic code. Genes are nature’s formulas 
of the genetic code. Modern genetic science has been 
de ned by the imperative to discover the full set of genes 
in the human genome.
Are human genes patentable? Not everything can be 
patented. This Court’s careful application of the patentable 
subject matter doctrine of 35 U.S.C. § 101 has provided 
guardianship for the “storehouse of knowledge” (Funk
1. Petitioners’ letter of consent to  le amicus briefs is on  le 
with the Court; Respondents’ emailed consent is attached to this 
brief. This brief was not authored in whole or in part by counsel for 
any party and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution 
intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No 
person other than amicus curiae made a monetary contribution 
to its preparation or submission.
2Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 
(1948)) and the “basic tools” (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 
U.S. 63, 67 (1972)) that comprise the intellectual inputs 
for patentable inventions. The Court has been quite 
clear that the “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas” are not patentable. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 
U.S. 175, 185 (1981). The underlying rationale for these 
exclusions is that scienti c advances originate from widely 
available basic knowledge, and therefore, patenting the 
intellectual substrates of a  eld has an adverse effect on its 
progress. In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus 
Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012), this Court 
recently con rmed the requirement for an “inventive 
concept” in order to establish patentable subject matter 
that is derived from the natural world.
Genes are not invented. This Court’s jurisprudence 
provides the basis for concluding that patent claims on 
human genes violate long-standing prohibitions against 
patenting laws of nature and products of nature. This brief 
presents two theories of patent ineligibility, grounded in 
the Court’s precedent, that disqualify genes as patentable 
subject matter: speci c and general. First, the gene is 
a DNA molecule with a speci c patent ineligibility that 
results from its unique property as the repository of 
the genetic code. The genes are the naturally occurring 
embodiments of the genetic code. The patenting of genes 
preempts the use of the genetic code and therefore 
preempts a law of nature. Second, the gene is a DNA 
molecule that is generally ineligible for patenting in view of 
the product of nature doctrine, which requires an inventive 
conversion of a natural product to secure patent rights. 
The isolated gene of the challenged patent claims retains 
natural structure in order to execute natural function. It 
is a product of nature, and as such, cannot be patented. 
3In determining patentable subject matter, Mayo 
requires the Court to measure any inventive contribution 
against the foreclosure of future innovation. That 
calculation leads to the conclusion that gene patenting 
exhibits an acute asymmetry: the absence of any inventive 
contribution is coupled with a damaging effect on the 
ability of scientists and medical practitioners to freely 
utilize the most basic discoveries of genetic science, with 
adverse consequences for the development of innovative 
advances in genetic medicine. Genes do not constitute 
patentable subject matter, and the patent claims should 
be invalidated.
ARGUMENT
I. The Exclusion of Laws and Products of Nature 
from Patenting Is Necessary to Generate Inventive 
Achievement
The boundaries of patentable subject matter are critical 
to a functioning patent system that encourages inventive 
achievement. Just last year, in Mayo Collaborative 
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 
1289 (2012), this Court revisited the doctrine of patentable 
subject matter as applied to the life sciences. Mayo 
involved patent claims to methods for determining 
optimal pharmaceutical dosing by using the correlations 
between metabolite levels and drug toxicity, which the 
Court characterized as a “law of nature.” Id. at 1296.
The Court unanimously concluded that the patent claims 
lacked any inventive contribution beyond merely reciting 
the correlations; it stated that the steps recited in the 
method claim “add nothing of signi cance to the natural 
laws themselves,” and that the claims were thus invalid 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id. at 1302. 
4Mayo made several general points regarding the 
necessity and rationale for the use of the patentable 
subject matter doctrine of 35 U.S.C. § 101. First, the Court 
reaf rmed the necessity for performing an eligibility 
analysis in the examination of a proposed invention for 
compliance with the patent statute. The Court explicitly 
declined an invitation to avoid patentable subject matter 
questions by substituting the other doctrinal requirements 
for patentability (e.g., utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101, novelty 
under 35 U.S.C. § 102, nonobviousness under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 103, and the disclosure doctrines of 35 U.S.C. § 112), 
noting that “to shift the patent eligibility inquiry entirely 
to these later sections risks creating signi cantly greater 
legal uncertainty.” Id. at 1304. 
Second, Mayo reaffirmed the complexity of the 
patentable subject matter inquiry, noting that the reach 
of 35 U.S.C. § 101 is not without limit: “The Court has long 
held that this provision contains an important implicit 
exception. ‘[L]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas’ are not patentable.” Id. at 1293 (quoting 
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)). The Court 
defined the policing of patentable subject matter by 
these categorical exclusions as a necessary predicate to 
maintaining a common stock of scienti c knowledge in the 
public domain. “[T]he cases have endorsed a bright-line 
prohibition against patenting laws of nature, mathematical 
formulas and the like, which serves as a somewhat more 
easily administered proxy for the underlying ‘building 
block’ concern.” Id. at 1303. Several years earlier, this 
Court had also reiterated the continuing relevance of these 
exclusions: “The concepts covered by these exceptions are 
‘part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men …free to all 
men and reserved exclusively to none.’” Bilski v. Kappos, 
5130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. 
v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)). 
These modern statements from Mayo and Bilski echo 
the Court’s observation from 40 years ago: “Phenomena 
of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, 
and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, 
as they are the basic tools of scienti c and technological 
work.” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). The 
sum of these pronouncements from the Court signals 
that it regards the patentable subject matter doctrine 
as providing a guardianship of the “basic tools,” the 
“building blocks” and the “storehouse of knowledge” of 
science – all of which are to be protected from private 
appropriation when 35 U.S.C. § 101 is applied with the 
precision demanded by this Court’s jurisprudence.
The challenged composition of matter claims recite 
the naturally occurring wild-type genes or naturally 
occurring mutated genes that correspond to the native 
human BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, although described in 
the claim language of “isolated DNA” (Claims 1, 2, and 7 of 
U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282, Claims 1, 6, and 7 of U.S. Patent 
No. 5,837,492 and Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473). 
Patent claims that comprise fragments of the BRCA1 gene 
can also operate to cover the use of the full-length gene 
(Claims 5 and 6 of U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282); as a result, 
their validity is subject to the same eligibility analysis.
Although the challenged patent claims to “isolated 
DNA” can be classi ed as compositions of matter with 
respect to the formal categories of inclusion detailed in 
35 U.S.C. § 101, the analysis does not end there. Patent 
claims must not capture the basic knowledge tools that are 
6essential for maintaining the vibrant intellectual climate 
of a technological  eld. “Patent law seeks to avoid the 
dangers of overprotection just as surely as it seeks to avoid 
the diminished incentive to invent that underprotection 
can threaten. One way in which patent law seeks to sail 
between these opposing and risky shoals is through rules 
that bring certain types of invention and discovery within 
the scope of patentability while excluding others.” Lab. 
Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 
124, 127 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the dismissal 
of the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted). The 
application of the law of nature doctrine and the product 
of nature doctrine to the isolated genes of the challenged 
patent claims is necessary to discern whether such claims 
impermissibly appropriate subject matter that belongs 
in the public domain. Detailed examination reveals that 
isolated genes remain products of nature, and their 
patenting preempts a law of nature. As such, they fail to 
meet this Court’s standards for patentable subject matter.
II. The Gene Has a Specific Patent Ineligibility 
Because Its Patenting Preempts a Law of Nature
A. The Genes are the Natural Embodiments of 
the Genetic Code, Which Is a Law of Nature 
Unraveling the biochemical infrastructure of 
inheritance revealed an underlying law of nature that 
explained the unique structure of DNA. “Only when 
the structure of DNA was discovered in the early 1950’s 
did it become clear how the hereditary information 
in cells is encoded in DNA’s sequence of nucleotides.” 
Bruce Alberts et al., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 
299, 4th edition (2002). The molecular design of DNA 
7was then understood to convey an informational code 
that accounted for its ability to function as the chemical 
repository of inheritance. A genetic code was discovered 
and deciphered, revealing a set of equivalences that link 
a speci c DNA nucleotide sequence to a speci c protein 
sequence. Id. at 336. The gene functions as a template 
according to the genetic code. “The genetic code is not 
the message itself but the ‘dictionary’ used by the cell to 
translate from the four-letter language of nucleic acid to 
the 20-letter language of protein.” Frances Crick, The 
Genetic Code III, 215 Scienti c American 55 (1966). The 
correlation between DNA and protein is central to the 
gene patent claims at issue. Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 
5,747,282 is a representative illustration of reliance on 
the genetic code when it simply claims “an isolated DNA 
coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide.” “[T]he relation itself 
exists in principle apart from any human action.” Mayo, 
132 S. Ct. at 1297.
The leading historian of the genetic code noted that 
the universality of the genetic code across the biological 
world was especially signi cant because “it would elevate 
the genetic code to the pedestal of universal laws of 
nature, a privilege usually reserved for the Olympian 
reaches of physics.” Lily E. Kay, WHO WROTE THE BOOK 
OF LIFE?: A HISTORY OF THE GENETIC CODE 276 (2000). The 
realization that the genetic code functioned as a natural 
law in the biological sciences led scientists to refer to the 
DNA-protein relation as the “central dogma” of molecular 
biology. Alberts et al., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL, 
at 301.
The genetic code, therefore, is equivalent in status to 
the laws of physics previously recognized as unpatentable 
8laws of nature in this Court’s patentable subject matter 
jurisprudence. “The laws of nature, physical phenomena, 
and abstract ideas have been held not patentable. Thus, a 
new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found 
in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, 
Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc2; 
nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such 
discoveries are ‘manifestations of….nature, free to all 
men and reserved exclusively to none.’” Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting Funk 
Bros., 333 U.S. at 130). This recitation of unpatentable 
scienti c laws by the Court provides a  rm basis for 
concluding that the discoveries of scienti c equivalences, 
whether the metabolite-toxicity relationship in Mayo 
or the genetic code in this case, cannot be patentable 
subject matter; in fact, these are precisely the kinds of 
intellectual achievements that must be segregated from 
the patent system so that they can be used freely by all. 
The designation of the genetic code as a law of nature has 
implications for the patenting of its natural embodiments, 
which are the genes. 
Genes are nature’s exemplars of the genetic code – as 
such, they embody the law of nature. The conversion of 
the genetic code into a human organism is accomplished 
by the set of formulas that are individually encapsulated 
as the genes. The gene, while formally described as 
a chemical compound, is functionally explained as a 
template. The dynamic gene operates by the laws of the 
genetic code. Activation of a gene initiates a sequence of 
metabolic events that unfold to accomplish the ultimate 
objective of generating a protein from a gene, a process 
generally known as gene expression. Extensive scienti c 
efforts have been expended to locate and characterize 
9the genes and to sequence the full human genome,  nally 
culminating in the efforts of the Human Genome Project. 
International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, 
Finishing the Euchromatic Sequence of the Human 
Genome, 431 Nature 931 (2004). The human genes are the 
natural formulas of the genetic code that are embedded 
in the human genome.
The use of the genetic code in genetic medicine is 
accomplished by research into the behavior of the genes, 
which dictate the structure and function of the human 
organism. While the science is novel and paradigm-
shifting, its impact is explained by its use of the naturally 
occurring molecules, the genes, to arrive at a precise 
and individualized account of an individual’s genetic and 
biochemical identity. “[T]he ultimate consequences of 
the integration of genomics into medical research and 
medical practice are likely to be revolutionary.” Alan F. 
Guttmacher and Francis S. Collins, Realizing the Promise 
of Genomics in Biomedical Research, 294 J. Am. Med. 
Ass’n 1399 (2005). The use of the genes is critical because 
these molecules carry the natural templates of the human 
organism. Thus, scientists must draw on the fundamental 
and uninvented principles of genetics to in order to develop 
practical applications for use in genetic medicine. 
Despite the technical work that underlies the 
identi cation and sequencing of the natural genes, there 
can be no dispute that such efforts do no more than reveal 
a natural blueprint. “The genome sequence is a discovery, 
not an invention.” John Sulston & Georgina Ferry, THE 
COMMON THREAD: A STORY OF SCIENCE, POLITICS, ETHICS, 
AND THE HUMAN GENOME 266 (2002). Accordingly, because 
the genes are the natural embodiments of the genetic 
10
code, the eligibility analysis of these molecules necessarily 
implicates the effect of patenting on the availability of this 
underlying law of nature. More precisely for patent law, 
this question is generally framed as investigating whether 
a law of nature is preempted by the grant of a patent claim, 
an outcome that con icts with this Court’s precedents. 
“The rule that the discovery of a law of nature cannot be 
patented rests, not on the notion that natural phenomena 
are not processes, but rather on the more fundamental 
understanding that they are not the kind of discoveries 
that the statute was enacted to protect.” Parker v. Flook, 
437 U.S. 583, 593 (1978).
B. The Patenting of Genes Preempts the Genetic 
Code, and Is Invalid According to the Court’s 
Prohibition Against Patenting Laws of Nature 
Although the Court has repeatedly stated that laws 
of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas are 
not patentable subject matter, the Court has been alert 
to possible preemption of the underlying idea through 
patenting practices. The Court recently elaborated on 
the underlying rationale for the law of nature exception 
when it cautioned against “the kind of risk that underlies 
the law of nature exception, namely the risk that a patent 
on the law would signi cantly impede future innovation.” 
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304. The preemption analysis from 
the Court’s jurisprudence provides the analytic tool for 
avoiding such risk. The claimed mathematical process in 
Benson provided such an example: “The mathematical 
formula involved here has no substantial practical 
application except in connection with a digital computer, 
which means that if the judgment below is af rmed, the 
patent would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula 
11
and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm 
itself.” Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72 (1972). 
Preemption of fundamental subject matter has been 
the focus of the two most recent patentable subject matter 
cases from this Court. Just last year, the Court de ned a 
persistent concern from its jurisprudence when it noted 
that its cases “warn us against upholding patents that 
claim processes that too broadly preempt the use of a 
natural law.” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294. Applying that 
warning to its analysis of the medical treatment claims 
in Mayo, the Court found preemption of an uninvented 
correlation between drug metabolism and toxicity when 
it reasoned that “upholding the patents would risk 
disproportionately tying up the use of the underlying 
natural laws, inhibiting their use in the making of further 
discoveries.” Id. In 2010, the Court employed a preemption 
analysis in concluding that the patenting of a method 
for hedging the risk of price changes had too broad an 
occlusive effect. “Allowing petitioners to patent risk 
hedging would preempt use of this approach in all  elds, 
and would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract 
idea.” Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3231 (2010). 
The preemption analysis can be applied to the isolated 
DNA claims at issue, because the claimed genes embody the 
most fundamental law of nature from biology, the genetic 
code. The issued patents in this case unambiguously 
document the natural identity of the claimed BRCA1 gene: 
“The nucleic acids of the present invention will possess 
a sequence which is either derived from, or substantially 
similar to a natural BRCA1-encoding gene or one having 
substantial homology with a natural BRCA1-encoding 
gene or a portion thereof.” U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282, 
12
column 19, lines 44-48 (italics added). The natural identity 
of the claimed BRCA2 gene is similarly described: “The 
nucleic acids of the present invention will possess a 
sequence which is either derived from, or substantially 
similar to a natural BRCA2-encoding gene or one having 
substantial homology with a natural BRCA2-encoding 
gene or a portion thereof.” U.S. Patent No. 5,837,492, 
column 18, lines 29-33 (italics added). Although the patent 
claims are formally directed to “isolated DNA,” the actual 
DNA sequence is the sequence of the “natural” wild-type 
or mutated gene, as the patents describe.
The patents claim to the isolated DNA at issue cover 
natural and uninvented expressions of the genetic code, 
and have preemptive effect. The genetic code, which is an 
unpatentable law of nature, does not effectively reside in 
the public domain if private rights are held in DNA gene 
sequences, so that the use of the nature’s expressions 
of the genetic code - the genes - are controlled through 
patent rights. The patenting of genes, therefore, results in 
effective preemption of the genetic code, an outcome that 
con icts with the Court’s dictate that the laws of nature 
should remain in the public domain, free for all to use. 
Eileen M. Kane, Splitting the Gene: DNA Patents and 
the Genetic Code, 71 Tenn. L. Rev. 707, 753 (2004).
The question presented in this case offers the Court 
an opportunity to resolve patent eligibility for the entire 
class of human genes, which comprise the human genome. 
A proper patentable subject matter analysis of one gene 
patent claim will resolve the patent eligibility for the class 
of molecules, because the relevant analysis is generic and 
not gene-speci c. The human genome can be understood 
as the compilation of nature’s formulas for the construction 
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of the human organism. Each and every gene patent has 
preemptive effect because it withdraws the use of one 
of nature’s genetic formulas; an outcome that allows “a 
patent to issue on one of the ancient secrets of nature now 
disclosed.” Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 131. 
The merger doctrine from copyright law supplies 
a relevant theoretical framework for understanding 
preemption in the context of genetic science. According 
to this doctrine, if an uncopyrightable idea has a set of 
 nite expressions, then property rights in the expressions 
are tantamount to ownership of the underlying idea; 
effectively, the idea and the expressions merge. Baker 
v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). The genes are nature’s 
 nite set of embodiments of the genetic code. Moreover, 
they are not modular or redundant - each embodiment is 
unique. The grant of private rights to the embodiments 
of the genetic code results in an effective grant of rights 
to the code itself. At the level of the human genome, the 
patenting of genes can be viewed as a merger problem 
writ large - if the embodiments of the underlying law 
of nature are subject to private appropriation through 
patent rights, then the underlying law of nature has itself 
entered the private domain. Kane, supra, at 754. Such an 
outcome does not comport with the Mayo requirement that 
“to transform an unpatentable law of nature into a patent 
eligible application of such a law, one must do more than 
simply state the law of nature while adding the words 
“apply it.” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (italics in original). 
Because the correlation between a DNA sequence and its 
cognate protein is a law of nature, and this correlation 
is central to the patent claims at issue, the claims are 
fatally analogous to the patent claims invalidated in Mayo, 
which failed to demonstrate “more than a drafting effort 
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designed to monopolize the law of nature itself.” Id. at 
1297. “The question before us is whether the claims do 
signi cantly more than simply describe these natural 
relations. To put the matter more precisely, do the patent 
claims add enough to their statements of the correlations 
to allow the processes they describe to qualify as patent 
eligible processes that apply natural laws?” Id. (italics 
in original). In this case, patent claims to isolated genes 
simply “inform a relevant audience about certain laws of 
nature.” Id. at 1298. They do no more.
The Federal Circuit did not consider a law of nature 
analysis to be relevant to its analysis of composition of 
matter claims. “[P]ermitting patents on isolated genes 
does not preempt a law of nature.” Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Of ce, 689 F.3d 
1303, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The court then acknowledged 
that “limited preemption” could be tolerated, but it then 
mischaracterized the concept of preemption (“a limited 
preemption is inherent in every patent). Id. However, 
preemption refers, in this Court’s jurisprudence, to 
instances where patenting can block access to certain 
unpatentable forms of subject matter. That de nition 
of preemption is independent of technological  eld or 
claim format, and it does not support a quanti cation of 
preemption. In fact, Mayo explicitly declined to “draw 
distinctions among laws of nature.” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 
at 1303. The Federal Circuit thus failed to apply all 
relevant analytic tools from this Court’s jurisprudence 
in its eligibility analysis of isolated genes, and it did not 
fully consider the complexity of the DNA molecule. The 
duality of DNA as both chemical and template requires a 
bifurcated legal analysis that draws on both process-based 
and product-based doctrines of eligibility developed in 
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patentable subject matter jurisprudence to derive analytic 
principles suitable for the eligibility analysis of a gene. 
Contrary to the court’s assertion that a “categorical rule” 
is created by a DNA-speci c eligibility analysis, the law 
of nature analysis of patented genes is necessitated by 
the multidimensional nature of the gene, and it is a logical 
application of well-established eligibility criteria from this 
Court. Gene patenting results in the preemption of a law 
of nature, the genetic code, and, consequently, the isolated 
genes do not constitute patentable subject matter.
III. The Gene Has a General Patent Ineligibility As a 
Product of Nature
A. The Isolated Gene Retains a Natural Structure 
Dictated by Natural Function, and is Not 
Markedly Different from the Cellular Gene
When considering whether a genetically engineered 
bacterium became an invented product, the Court 
noted that the patentable subject matter inquiry must 
distinguish “between products of nature, whether living or 
not, and human-made inventions.” Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 
at 313. The distinction between a product of nature and an 
invented product was further de ned by the Court when 
it recognized that an inventive conversion of a natural 
product would require the demonstration of “markedly 
different characteristics” in a claimed product. Id. at 
310. The Court recognized that patent eligibility could 
be satis ed by a “product of human ingenuity” “having a 
distinctive name, character [and] use.” Id. at 309-10. 
In order to apply this Court’s standard to the present 
case, the comparison of the “isolated DNA” in the 
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composition of matter claims on wild-type and mutant 
genes to the naturally occurring genes has two separate 
inquiries. Formally, these are the questions of structure 
and function. Is the isolated DNA structurally identical 
to the native gene? Does the isolated DNA function in the 
same manner as the native gene? However, these questions 
converge for DNA. The structure of the isolated DNA of 
the patent claims is not chosen, and certainly not invented, 
but required - because it will provide the natural function 
of the gene. 
Structure and function converge in the patent 
claims at issue. Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 is 
representative of this convergence when it claims “an 
isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide” – claiming 
a molecule with a structure that will allow it to execute its 
normal function, which is to encode the BRCA1 protein. 
The patent claim simply “reports” that a particular DNA 
sequence encodes the amino acid sequence that constitutes 
a natural protein. 
The isolated DNA of the patent claims is a product 
of nature’s design. While Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 
5,747,282 reports a DNA sequence de ned by “coding,” 
other challenged claims report DNA coding sequences 
written in complementary DNA (cDNA) format (e.g., Claim 
2 of U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282). A puri ed gene is often 
claimed as an isolated cDNA - the abbreviated, message-
bearing form of the gene. Alberts et al., MOLECULAR 
BIOLOGY OF THE CELL, at 503. The cDNA molecule is 
produced by routine, conventional laboratory protocols. 
Jonathan Pevsner, BIOINFORMATICS AND FUNCTIONAL 
GENOMICS 302, 2nd edition (2009). The goal of recovering 
the gene sequence as a cDNA is to preserve the “natural” 
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informational content of the molecule so that it is identical 
to the native gene. The patents in this case document the 
functional identity - and therefore structural identity - of 
the isolated BRCA1 DNA to native genes, describing “a 
sequence which is either derived from, or substantially 
similar to a natural BRCA1-encoding gene,” U.S. Patent 
No. 5,747,282, column 19, lines 45-46 (italics added); the 
identity of isolated BRCA2 DNA to the native genes is 
noted by “a sequence which is either derived from, or 
substantially similar to a natural BRCA2-encoding gene,“ 
U.S. Patent No. 5,837,492, column 18, lines 30-31 (italics 
added). Those statements simply report that structure 
will implement function for the isolated DNA molecules, 
and that the function is nothing more than the mechanical 
reproduction of nature’s blueprint. This conclusion applies 
to all challenged patent claims – whether primarily 
de ned by function (“coding for”) or primarily de ned by 
structure (cDNA). All such claims have identical effect, 
which is to claim patent rights on a naturally occurring 
BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene. In fact, any deviation from the 
natural DNA sequence would compromise the use of the 
isolated DNA as the functional equivalent of the cellular 
gene, as the patented molecules provide the foundation for 
Myriad’s BRCA1 and BRCA2 genetic tests. The mimicry 
of the native gene undermines any assertion that an 
inventive alteration has occurred. 
In Funk Bros., this Court considered whether the 
repackaging of natural bacterial strains in a mixed 
inoculant created a patent-eligible product. The Court 
concluded that neither structure or function were 
altered in the claimed bacterial product: “The bacteria 
perform in their natural way. Their use in combination 
does not improve in any way their natural functioning. 
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They serve the ends nature originally provided and act 
quite independently of any effort of the patentee.” Funk 
Bros., 333 U.S. at 131. By analogy, the isolated genes 
retain a structure that allows their natural function to 
be maintained, and “serve the ends nature originally 
provided.” Id. They are products of nature, and cannot 
be patented.
B. There is No Inventive Conversion of the 
Isolated Gene, and it Remains an Unpatentable 
Product of Nature
The tests derived from this Court’s jurisprudence 
for identifying an unpatentable product of nature focus 
on difference. The “markedly different characteristics” 
required by Chakrabarty are further amplified with 
reference to “having a distinctive name, character 
[and] use.” Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309-310. Funk 
Bros. examined the properties of the claimed bacterial 
inoculant to determine if they re ected any inventive 
input. “The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of 
the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part 
of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are 
manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and 
reserved exclusively to none.” Funk Bros., 333 U.S. at 
130. The Court stated that the inventor had simply made 
a “discovery of some of the handiwork of nature.” Id. at 
131. No human intervention accounted for the properties 
exhibited by the bacteria, and the Court did not con ate 
discovery with invention. 
In American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 
283 U.S. 1 (1931), directed to a claimed invention of a 
chemically-treated orange, the Court decided that the 
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addition of borax to the rind of an orange to increase its 
longevity did not confer a patentable distinction, when 
compared to an unadulterated orange, to create an article 
of manufacture, stating that “[a]ddition of [the] borax to 
the rind of [the] natural fruit does not produce from the 
raw material an article for use which possesses a new 
or distinctive form, quality, or property.” Id. at 11. The 
Court’s cases suggest that the comparison of a claimed 
invention to a natural product must be comprehensive 
and thorough, and consider all relevant properties in 
determining whether an inventive conversion has been 
accomplished.
In view of these precedents, the Federal Circuit 
utilized an unduly narrow lens to compare the isolated 
DNA at issue with the naturally occurring genes. “We 
recognize that biologists may think of molecules in terms 
of their uses, but genes are in fact materials having a 
chemical nature and, as such, are best described in patents 
by their structures rather than by their functions.” Ass’n 
for Molecular Pathology, 689 F.3d. at 1330. This statement 
ignores the fact that the patent claims themselves merge 
structure with function. Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 
5,747,282 is representative of this convergence when it 
claims “an isolated DNA coding for a BRCA1 polypeptide.” 
Claim 2 of the same patent claims a cDNA molecule - which 
has a structure solely de ned by its functional coding 
requirements.
The analytic error of focusing on structure to the 
exclusion of function is compounded by an idiosyncratic 
de nition of the structural features that are accorded 
inventive weight. “[I]n nature, the claimed isolated DNAs 
are covalently bonded to such other materials. Thus, when 
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cleaved, an isolated DNA molecule is not a puri ed form 
of a natural material, but a distinct chemical entity that is 
obtained by human intervention.” Id. at 1329. The Federal 
Circuit erred in elevating the cleavage of a covalent bond 
during the excision of DNA into a transformative act 
that conferred patent eligibility. Instead, it is a routine 
technical operation that facilitates the removal of the 
gene from its native environment to an isolated state. 
Moreover, there is no basis in this Court’s precedents 
for characterizing any speci c chemical manipulation 
of natural subject matter as an eligibility-conferring 
maneuver.
The comparative analysis from the Federal Circuit 
overlooks several features of the isolated DNA at issue. 
The chemical cleavage that produces an isolated gene is not 
a manipulation that alters the intrinsic properties of the 
isolated product. The isolated DNA retains the naturally 
occurring nucleotide sequence, which the appellate court 
did not regard as relevant. “[I]t is the distinctive nature 
of DNA molecules as isolated compositions of matter 
that determines their patent eligibility rather than their 
physiological use or bene t.” Id. at 1330. When the court 
declared that “the patent eligibility of an isolated DNA is 
not negated because it has similar informational properties 
to a different, more complex natural material,” it failed to 
credit the fact that all of the chemical processing of the 
claimed DNA was actually driven by a genetic objective: 
to recover an isolated gene with an intact informational 
character. Id. No inventive conversion can be detected 
when the objective is simply to capture the naturally 
occurring genetic template and transport it outside the 
cell, and such repackaging cannot confer patent eligibility 
to the natural product. The isolated gene is thus more 
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akin to the aggregated bacterial inoculant in Funk Bros.: 
“Even though it may have been the product of skill, it 
certainly was not the product of invention.” Funk Bros., 
333 U.S. at 132.
The starting materials for the patent claims are the 
native BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, and the processing 
that produces the claimed genes does not produce a 
nonnaturally occurring product, as both structure and 
function remain intact. There is no demonstration of the 
inventive conversion required by this Court for the patent 
eligibility of naturally-derived subject matter. As such, the 
isolated genes are products of nature, and do not constitute 
patentable subject matter.
IV. This Court’s Precedent Requires That A Patent Not 
Exact More in Costs Than It Provides in Bene ts
A. An Asymmetry Between Inventive Contribution 
and the Foreclosure of Innovation is Prohibited 
by Mayo
Just last year, in Mayo, this Court was very clear 
about the need to measure the potentially preemptive 
or inhibitory effect of a patent against the magnitude of 
any inventive contribution provided by its subject matter. 
“[T]he underlying functional concern here is a relative 
one: how much future innovation is foreclosed relative to 
the contribution of the inventor.” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303 
(italics in original). In the view of the Court, the most 
troubling scenario is presented when a patent involving 
a natural law or product but lacking any inventive 
contribution has an occlusive impact on technological 
innovation because it removes basic knowledge from 
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the public domain. “And so there is a danger that the 
grant of patents that tie up their use will inhibit future 
innovation premised upon them, a danger that becomes 
acute when a patented process amounts to no more than 
an instruction to ‘apply the natural law,’ or otherwise 
forecloses more future invention than the underlying 
discovery could reasonably justify.” Id. at 1301. To apply 
the Mayo formulation, the inventive contribution must be 
assessed, and compared to any foreclosure of innovation, 
in order to identify illegitimate patenting that exacts 
more in costs than it provides in bene ts. The need for 
symmetry has been noted by this Court before. “The 
Patent Clause itself re ects a balance between the need 
to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies 
which sti e competition without any concomitant advance 
in the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” Bonito Boats 
v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
Mayo further considered how the discovery of natural 
laws and products were affected by the availability of 
patent rights, rejecting any invitation to lessen inventive 
standards in order to stimulate scientific discovery. 
Mayo explicitly recognized that even if patenting were 
to encourage research into laws of nature and basic 
scienti c principles, the cost of patenting basic scienti c 
knowledge would still be too high: “These statements 
re ect the fact that, even though rewarding with patents 
those who discover new laws of nature and the like might 
well encourage their discovery, those laws and principles, 
considered generally, are ‘the basic tools of scienti c and 
technological work.’” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301 (quoting 
Benson, 409 U.S. at 67). Patent rights are reserved for 
truly inventive work, and patent claims to natural laws and 
products controvert both Mayo and the essential patent 
bargain. “A patent by its very nature is affected with a 
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public interest. As recognized by the Constitution, it is 
a special privilege designed to serve the public purpose 
of promoting the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’” 
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. 
Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1944) (quoting U.S. CONST. art 
I, § 8, cl. 8). 
The Mayo framework for granting patent rights for 
actual inventive achievement is broadly applicable to all 
patent claims, whether to products (e.g., compositions of 
matter) or methods. Although Mayo was directed to the 
patent eligibility of method claims, the Mayo formulation 
is grounded in the underlying purposes of the patent 
system, and is not technology-speci c or claim-dependent. 
Consequently, Mayo’s formulation can be squarely applied 
to the composition of matter claims at issue here. 
B. Gene Patents Exemplify the Asymmetry 
Between Invention and Occlusion that Mayo 
Prohibits
The application of the Mayo formulation asks whether 
there is an inventive contribution that is commensurate 
with any foreclosure of innovation. In fact, this case 
reveals an acute asymmetry: the isolated BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genes at issue are not invented, but the patenting 
of these genes has severely limited innovative development 
in the  eld of genetic testing, with adverse consequences 
for genetic medicine. Thus, this case is a paradigmatic 
illustration of the “danger” from illegitimate patenting 
that Mayo warned about.
First, as the foregoing analyses in Parts II and III, 
supra, have detailed, the “isolated DNA” claims are 
directed to or derived from naturally occurring wild-type 
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or mutant forms of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes or, in the 
case of patent claims on DNA fragments, have a scope that 
can include naturally occurring genes. The presentation 
of a native gene as an “isolated DNA” molecule in the 
patent claims is the result of routine, well-established 
protocols in the  eld of molecular biology that do not alter 
or enhance the naturally occurring DNA sequence of the 
gene, and are conceptually analogous to the additional 
steps in the invalidated Mayo method claims which “add 
nothing of signi cance to the laws of nature.” Mayo, 132 
S. Ct. at 1299. Because the “isolated DNA” retains natural 
structure and function, the patent claims capture products 
of nature and preempt a law of nature. 
The genes are basic scienti c tools which have no 
effective substitutes. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss and James 
P. Evans, From Bilski Back to Benson: Preemption, 
Inventing Around and the Case of Genetic Diagnostics, 
63 Stan. L. Rev. 1349, 1371 (2011). This fact only heightens 
the importance of rectifying the fact that such singular 
tools of biological science have been captured by patenting 
despite the absence of an inventive justi cation. The 
absence of any inventive contribution in the challenged 
patent claims violates the Court’s standard for patentable 
subject matter, and provides the  rst part of the analysis 
for the Mayo formulation.
Second, the Mayo formulation requires an assessment 
of whether any foreclosure of innovation is the result of 
the patent grant. The patenting of DNA – as genes – 
removes critical scienti c tools from widespread use in 
research and medicine by genetic scientists and medical 
practitioners, with adverse consequences for patients. The 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genetic testing  eld is a signature 
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example of how unjusti ed patent claims have exerted 
undue weight in limiting the development of breast cancer 
and ovarian cancer genetic medicine. The record in this 
case is replete with instances where scientists had to 
abandon the offering of genetic testing services, doctors 
could not provide genetic information as a part of medical 
care, and patients encountered limited or faulty genetic 
testing options for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, all 
as a result of the restrictive climate created by these 
patents. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Of ce, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 205-207 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010).
Genetic testing can be used to identify disease 
susceptibility, to establish diagnostic status, and to 
design personalized therapeutic regimens in medical 
care. Restrictive management of gene patents with 
critical diagnostic signi cance limits peer assessment, 
and reduces the available testing options for patients. 
Robert Cook Deegan et al., Impact of Gene Patents and 
Licensing Practices on Access to Genetic Testing for 
Inherited Susceptibility to Cancer: Comparing Breast 
and Ovarian Cancers with Colon Cancers, 12 Genetics 
in Medicine S15 (2010). 
When a patent holder dominates a clinical  eld as 
the sole provider of genetic testing services, as Myriad 
has done for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, patients 
are adversely affected. “Where patents and licensing 
practices have created a sole provider of a genetic test, 
patient access to those tests has suffered in a number of 
ways.” The Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, 
Health and Society (SACGHS), Gene Patents and 
Licensing Practices and Their Impact on Patient Access 
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to Genetic Tests 3 (2010) [hereinafter “SACGHS”]. If the 
sole commercial provider of a particular genetic test does 
not offer a comprehensive genetic analysis, the test will not 
provide the most accurate assessment of genetic status, 
and compensatory genetic testing to correct de ciencies 
may be prohibited by the patent holder. An arti cially 
constrained genetic testing climate can result in patients 
receiving incomplete test results that cannot be relied 
on for medical decision making. Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 206. 
Myriad’s limitations on commercial genetic testing 
for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes to determine the risk 
of hereditary breast and ovarian cancer have limited the 
ability of women to seek second opinions or con rmatory 
analysis of laboratory results. Id. at 207. This scenario 
is even more troubling because some of the patients 
receiving BRCA1 and BRCA2 genetic testing from 
Myriad had genetic mutations that were not detected by 
Myriad’s testing protocols, and these women received 
false negative test results. Tom Walsh et al., Spectrum 
of Mutations in BRCA1, BRCA2, CHEK2, and TP53 
in Families at High Risk of Breast Cancer, 295 J. Am. 
Med. Ass’n 1379, 1386 (2006). Where exclusive control of 
the relevant patent portfolio for a particular disease  eld 
has frustrated a competitive genetic testing environment 
- as is the case for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes - the 
consequences for patients are very real. The clinical 
standard of care becomes a function of the marketplace, 
rather than the laboratory, commercial objectives trump 
scienti c merit, and patients encounter a distorted set 
of options for medical care. Eileen M. Kane, Patent-
Mediated Standards in Genetic Testing, 2008 Utah L. 
Rev. 835, 849. This outcome highlights the importance of 
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the patent eligibility questions posed by this litigation, 
and validates Mayo’s persistent focus on a cost-bene t 
analysis to determine the legitimacy of a patent grant.
It has been argued that gene patents are necessary to 
incentivize genetic research and the development of genetic 
tests. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 
211. The SACGHS undertook a comprehensive analysis 
on the need for and impact of patents affecting genetic 
testing, and asked whether the availability of patent rights 
stimulates scienti c curiosity and engagement in genetic 
science. “[T]his information suggests that scientists are 
motivated to conduct genetic research by reasons other 
than patents, suggesting that discoveries will be sought 
regardless of the availability of intellectual property 
rights.” SACGHS at 23. According to the SACGHS, the 
steady march of genetic research was not a patent-induced 
phenomenon. “[P]atents are not needed for much of U.S. 
basic genetic research to occur.” Id. at 2. 
Are gene patents essential for encouraging the 
development of in-house genetic testing services by 
commercial laboratories, such as for the BRCA1 and 
BRCA2 genetic tests? The SACGHS concluded that they 
were not. “[P]atent derived exclusive rights are neither 
necessary nor suf cient conditions for the development of 
genetic test kits and laboratory-developed tests. In the 
area of laboratory-developed tests particularly, where 
development costs are not substantial, patents were not 
necessary for the development of several genetic tests.” 
Id. at 35. The genetic tests offered by Myriad fall into 
the latter category of laboratory-developed tests. Any 
assertions that the invalidation of gene patents will 
have devastating consequences on biomedical innovation 
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cannot be reconciled with the empirical research 
demonstrating that gene patents do not incentivize much 
of the progress in genetic science and are not critical for 
the commercialization of testing services.
The lack of incentives provided by gene patents does 
not equate to an absence of impact when they have been 
granted. Gene patents, although unnecessary, are costly. 
This paradox only magni es the harm created by the 
patenting of genes. Petitioners have amply demonstrated 
the limitations on research and patient care that have 
been created with the issuance of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 
gene patents. Illegitimate gene patent claims in force 
have constrained the set of knowledge tools in the public 
domain, a consequence that has foreclosed innovation in 
the genetic testing  eld by imposition of a chilling effect. 
That was documented by the SACGHS in its review of 
Myriad’s impact on the legal climate in which genetic 
research takes place. “Myriad therefore cannot fully 
elude responsibility for any chilling effect on research, 
because the company could fully anticipate that others 
would refrain from research for fear of being sued for 
infringement.” SACGHS at A-27.
The concerns over the inhibitory effects of gene 
patenting received Congressional attention during the 
enactment of the America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA), Pub. 
L. 112–29 (2011). As a consequence, the AIA included 
a mandate that directed the United States Patent and 
Trademark Of ce to undertake a study on “effective ways 
to provide independent, con rming genetic diagnostic 
test activity where gene patents and exclusive licensing 
for primary genetic diagnostic tests exist.” Id., Section 
27. Congress speci cally asked for an assessment of “the 
impact that the current lack of independent second opinion 
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testing has had on the ability to provide the highest 
level of medical care to patients and recipients of genetic 
diagnostic testing, and on inhibiting innovation to existing 
testing and diagnoses.” Id. Legislative scrutiny of the 
consequences from issuing a speci c class of patents – on 
human genes - is further evidence that such patents have 
an undue adverse impact on medical care.
The application of Mayo’s formulation for identifying 
illegitimate patenting (invention vs. occlusion) leads 
to the inescapable conclusion that gene patenting has 
demonstrable costs, while failing to provide commensurate 
benefits. Moreover, available evidence has failed to 
document that gene patents have provided critical 
incentives for genetic medicine, further compounding the 
error of granting such patents. Gene patenting exhibits 
the asymmetry that Mayo warned about: the absence of 
any inventive contribution is coupled with a damaging 
effect on the ability of scientists and medical practitioners 
to freely utilize the most basic discoveries of genetic 
science, with adverse consequences for the development 
of innovative advances in genetic medicine. 
The toll exacted on genetic science and medicine from 
the grant of illegitimate gene patents can be reversed by 
this Court’s invalidation of the gene patent claims. Although 
both the executive branch (SACGHS) and the legislative 
branch (Congress) of the U.S. government have contended 
with limiting the harm created by gene patenting, this 
Court has the authority to squarely address the validity of 
gene patents by performing an exacting eligibility analysis 
of the challenged patent claims, using the standards 
that have been developed to de ne the boundaries of 
the patent system. While bioethical and human rights 
objections have been raised to the patenting of genes, 
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it is clear that this Court’s jurisprudence provides the 
basis for declaring that the discoveries of genetic science, 
including human genes, cannot be patented, in view of the 
law of nature and product of nature exclusions. The Court 
has an opportunity to restore the set of “basic tools” for 
genetic science, and to invalidate gene patenting for the 
bene t of scientists, medical practitioners, and patients 
who wish to use isolated genes in research and medical 
care. This Court’s precise application of 35 U.S.C. § 101 
will allow creative applications of fundamental knowledge 
to emerge and legitimately solicit legal protection, and 
ensure that the intellectual substrates for genetic science 
remain unowned.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reaf rm 
that patents may not issue for laws of nature or products 
of nature, and hold that the violation of these prohibitions 
invalidates patent claims to human genes under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101.
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